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California’s housing crisis has sparked a 
necessary dialogue about displacement, 
gentrification, and neighborhood control 
over land use. In these discussions, more attention 
ought to be paid to the spatial inequality that governs 
housing development and how cities have arrived 
at their highly unequal distribution of density and 
development. Although many people agree that the 
state’s unprecedentedly high housing costs are the result 
of a severe housing shortage — one that hurts renters 
and benefits homeowners — they disagree about where 
this needed new housing will be built.
Not surprisingly, there is significant resistance to 
new construction from those that benefit most from 
its scarcity: Homeowners and landlords. Too few 
are advocating for upending the existing pattern of 
zoning and increasing construction in neighborhoods 
of opportunity, which currently exclude low- and 
middle-income households. How can we reform our 
planning systems to increase supply on the one hand, 
and to reduce the unequal spatial distribution of new 
development on the other? 
To find pragmatic, implementable policy solutions, we 
must first take stock of what barriers prevent necessary 
new housing from being built in the neighborhoods with 
the highest demand. Researchers at UCLA examined 
the tactics available to opponents of new housing 
development and categorized the motivations behind 
anti-development sentiment. Mapping the structural 
motivations of neighbors and the diversity of tools 
that can block or scale back a project reveals the size 
and shape of the problem. Identifying the most salient 
motivations behind opposition to housing construction 
can help us overcome these barriers with far-reaching 
solutions.
Why must we address opposition to new and 
affordable housing and density in general?
Limiting the supply of housing in the face of stable or 
growing demand pushes rents up. Academic research
POLICY BRIEF
Overcoming Opposition to New Housing
2017 | Paavo Monkkonen and Will Livesley-O’Neill 
 lewis.ucla.edu
consistently finds that constraints to urban infill and 
urban expansion, such as restrictive zoning, historic 
preservation ordinances, or multiple independent 
reviews, increases the price of housing.1,2,3,4,5,6,7  Second, 
the way we decide where new housing is permitted 
exacerbates existing spatial inequalities. Excluding 
multi-family housing with low-density zoning 
prices low- and middle-income households out of 
neighborhoods with quality public services, particularly 
high-performing schools,8  as well as amenities such 
as parks. Barring families from high-opportunity 
neighborhoods entrenches inequality and reduces social 
mobility in the long run.9, 10, 11
Low-density zoning also hurts the regional economy. 
Less housing makes it harder for workers to find a place 
to live. The city, unable to house workers, becomes 
less appealing to firms that rely on a local labor pool. 
Pushing people elsewhere incentivizes firms to locate 
elsewhere. A city that can’t house workers stunts its 
own potential for economic growth and dynamism.12,13 
California’s high housing costs appear to be driving an 
exodus of tech start-ups from the Bay Area to places like 
Phoenix, Boise, and Salt Lake City.14 The main group to 
benefit from higher housing prices is existing property 
owners — both landlords and homeowners. In a sense, 
preventing newcomers from moving to urban areas with 
strong economies allows existing landowners to capture 
and hoard the productivity gains that were produced 
collectively.15
Current residents are structurally incentivized 
to oppose newcomers 
California’s property tax system, as regulated by 
Proposition 13, reassesses property values — and 
therefore property taxes — only when the property 
changes hands. This is a boon for longtime homeowners 
and landlords whose assessed values are far below 
the current market value. It also shapes the politics of 
planning for more housing. If existing homeowners had 
to pay their fair share in property taxes, rising home 
values would make them more amenable to solutions 
that dampen price increases. 
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Another result of Proposition 13 is that municipal 
governments lose out on needed revenue and turn to 
impact fees and other sources to make up for the lost 
funds. The permit approval process for new housing is 
increasingly seen as a moment to recapture the land 
value, and cities ask developers of new housing to pay 
for community benefits, fund infrastructure, and add 
affordable housing units. Yet long-term owners and 
landlords face no such fiscal obligation to contribute to 
the market cost of the very amenities from which they 
benefit.
Figure 1. Property tax revenue similarly stable before 
and after Proposition 13
How can new housing help alleviate upward 
pressure on housing prices? 
A recently built apartment is generally more expensive 
than a unit that has seen some wear and tear. But 
even though a brand new unit may be out of reach 
for most, at the metropolitan level, even expensive 
new units improve overall affordability. The way 
new building impacts localized housing markets is an 
understudied process, however, and will likely vary 
across metropolitan areas. Better empirical evidence is 
needed to understand how new construction relates to 
neighborhood change, and the clear distinction between 
regional and local housing market dynamics must be 
emphasized.
A process of filtering — high-income households moving 
into newer, more expensive units and freeing up existing 
older units for households with slightly lower incomes 
— is often used to explain the role of new housing in a 
housing market, though in many California cities it clearly 
does not occur.16 And filtering will never occur if sufficient 
new housing is not built, such as in the case of California’s 
major metropolitan areas. On the contrary, when new 
housing is not available, high-income households tend 
to renovate and occupy older housing units that would 
otherwise become available to less well-off households.
A holistic housing policy requires prioritizing housing 
subsidies and other mechanisms to keep people in 
their homes, in addition to increasing housing supply 
to accommodate newcomers. A focus on supply as a 
solution to California’s housing crisis must acknowledge 
the displacement pressure new construction may create 
at the neighborhood level. Indeed, anti-displacement 
sentiment from long-term renters is one of the common 
drivers of housing opposition.17 Although seemingly 
counterintuitive, blocking development does not prevent 
neighborhood change. Rents rise because of demand 
for housing and lack of supply, and this can displace 
households whether or not new luxury condominiums 
are built nearby.
Drivers of opposition to new housing
Based on our review of minutes from neighborhood 
council meetings in Los Angeles, and stakeholder 
interviews in both Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay 
Area, we distill the concerns that drive opposition to new 
housing into three categories: Concerns about the built 
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Figure 2. New multifamily developmentsenvironment, concerns about who lives near you, 
and concerns about the development process. See 
Table 1 for a summary of reasons for opposition to 
housing projects selected from public hearings in 
neighborhood councils throughout Los Angeles.
Concerns about the built environment are 
dominated by anxiety about traffic congestion 
and access to parking, but also include general 
complaints about crowding and strain on local 
amenities.18 Additional concerns about the quality 
of the nearby natural environment and maintaining 
property values could also fall under this category.19
Concerns about who lives near you are typically 
expressed in coded language. The vague catch-all 
term “neighborhood character” routinely surfaces 
as a complaint in wealthier neighborhoods, such as 
Greater Wilshire and Westwood. While the term 
can convey a range of meanings, who uses it and 
how suggests that the term can often be coded 
discrimination. Moreover, most homeowners 
who claim to want neighborhood stability do not 
acknowledge that price increases are a kind of 
neighborhood change.
Finally, objections to the housing development 
process have become common for opponents 
of new housing. They include condemnations of 
variances and discretionary review, allegations of 
political corruption in entitlement approvals, and 
complaints over a lack of community outreach. 
Developers are often portrayed as the unfair 
winners in times when new housing is expensive. 
Yet this ignores the fact that landlords and 
homeowners unfairly profit from housing scarcity to 
much greater degree.
The mechanics of opposition to new 
housing
By way of three overarching systems — planning, 
legal, and political — we estimate that local 
residents have approximately 20 formal avenues 
to oppose housing.20 The more familiar veto points 
are appeals to specific projects or lawsuits under 
the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). 
However, a number of broader, long-term tactics 
can be just as, if not more, effective, including 
stalling the community planning process, running 
ballot initiatives, or lobbying for state laws (see 
Table 2 for the complete list). The vocal advocacy 
of a handful of neighbors is often framed as local 
democracy, but many of these processes exclude 
the majority of a neighborhood’s residents and 
explicitly favor those with more money and time.
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Table 1. Opposition to housing projects in Los Angeles neighborhood councils 
Neighborhood Council21 Reasons for Opposition to Housing Projects
Boyle Heights Loss of tax revenue
Downtown Los Angeles
Blocked views, health and well-being, neighborhood character, historic preservation, lack of 
public/green space, higher rents
East Hollywood Lack of engagement with the community
Empowerment Congress North Lack of engagement with the community, influx of low-income residents 
Greater Wilshire
Neighborhood character, aesthetics, scale, privacy, traffic congestion, 
pedestrian safety
Historic Highland Park
Neighborhood character, lack of engagement with the community, displacement/gentrification, 
environmental impact, too much density
United Neighborhoods Neighborhood character
Westwood Neighborhood character, historic preservation, legal precedent, environmental impact
Table 2. Avenues to influence what does and does not get built
Type of Avenue Methods
Planning system
1. Communicate concern by commenting in public fora, writing letters, using social media, 
and circulating petitions22
2. Appeal specific projects
3. Design review
4. File historic designation petitions for properties or districts23
5. In new specific plans, advocate for requirements beyond the baseline zoning24 standards
6. Make methodology for assessing housing needs inadequate25
7. Influence community planning process26
8. Regulatory capture of regional planning agencies such as ABAG
Legal system
1. Sue projects under CEQA
2. Sue plans under CEQA27
3. Threaten to sue, or “Greenmail”28 developers, based on CEQA lawsuits in order to get pay-
offs or concessions from developers for non-environmental community benefits 
4. Sue for developers not meeting a discretionary condition
5. Sue to invalidate permit or policy29
Political system
1. Run ballot initiatives to place a moratorium on development30
2. Lobby City Council members individually (blocking discretionary permits)
3. Recall council members (Westwood case)
4. Run for office and elect anti-development council members
5. Lobby for state laws that affect specific cities’ rules 
Other avenues for expressing 
preferences 
1. Influence developers before they submit proposals by informally floating development 
concepts with their council member and local neighborhood association
2. Influence public opinion about development by creating negative labels for certain types of 
housing, such as McMansions or “mega developments”
3. Accuse developers and politicians of corruption, and build a coalition with a shared ideolo-
gy of crusading against corruption, destruction, and growth 
4. Influence new or potential residents in a neighborhood to deter change31
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Enhance (and enforce) existing 
housing laws
California has one of the nation’s most comprehensive 
state housing laws, designed to encourage cities 
to consider their development needs and then set 
targets to meet those needs. The housing element 
law uses population projections to estimate how 
many new housing units will be needed in the state, 
and regional councils of government allocate these 
units to cities and counties, which are then required 
to update the housing element of their General Plans 
to accommodate future housing needs. While the 
framework is conceptually sound, it needs two major 
reforms: Enforcement and a methodology that makes 
sense.
First, the enforcement of our state law was virtually 
nonexistent until recently. Cities that fail to meet their 
housing targets have faced no consequences, and 
cities that achieve them have reaped no rewards.32 
A 2017 law, Senate Bill 35, has now created a long-
needed enforcement mechanism to facilitate needed 
housing construction in cities that have not met their 
fair share goals. Further efforts along these lines should 
be considered, and new incentives to meet housing 
goals might be created.
Second, the way in which housing needs are currently 
calculated and allocated allow many cities to indirectly 
resist new housing. Future household formation 
is projected based on past trends, which biases 
estimates downward in places where increasingly 
expensive housing slows growth. This reinforces a 
process where higher-density places — often lower-
income — get more housing needs allocated to them 
and lower-density places — often wealthier — get less. 
Furthermore, the way the regional councils allocate 
housing to cities does not have goals of improving 
affordability or environmental sustainability, and it 
should.
2. Make the planning process more inclusive
The current planning process is not designed to solicit 
representative citizen feedback. Anecdotal evidence 
consistently suggests that certain groups are too loud 
and other groups are left without a voice. As currently 
structured, the feedback process requires individuals 
to have the resources to interpret proposals, stay 
regularly informed, travel to hearings during the 
workweek, and often wait hours to speak. A review 
of neighborhood council meeting minutes makes it 
3. Shift the scale of land use decisions from 
local to regional/state
Researchers find that when higher levels of government 
control land use decisions, rules are less exclusionary 
and reduce socioeconomic segregation.33 There is a 
scalar mismatch in the governance of housing markets. 
Housing markets, like labor markets, operate at the 
regional level, yet land use decisions are made at the city 
level. As a result, each municipality is incentivized to limit 
its housing supply to exclude new residents of the region 
even as that municipality reaps the collective benefits 
created by the region’s economic dynamism. Moving 
the scale of political action on land use decisions to the 
regional or even state level would match the scale of the 
economic market, and would more accurately represent 
all those affected by land use decisions.
Opposition to new housing and increased housing 
density are major components of California’s current 
housing problem. In many of the state’s cities a vast 
majority of residential land is zoned only for single-family 
housing, which drastically limits potential supply. The 
fact that our planning system provides so many avenues 
to block changes to existing zoning creates an unequal 
spatial distribution of new housing development by 
concentrating most new housing production in places 
already zoned for multi-family or other uses, which tend 
to be lower-income neighborhoods. Thus, not only do 
we experience general affordability problems, we see 
gentrification and displacement in many neighborhoods, 
in particular. It is time to implement reforms to improve 
the way decisions are made over where and how much 
housing is permitted in California, and recognize that 
the status quo exacerbates inequality by benefiting 
homeowners at the expense of renters.
CONCLUSION
obvious that discussion and decisions need to be made 
more understandable to the general public, especially 
people who speak English as a second language. Cities 
can tackle this problem on at least two fronts: Building 
in non-traditional platforms, such as social media and 
web forums, for broader inclusion, and disbanding the 
existing input channels that overrepresent older, whiter, 
and wealthier residents.
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